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AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER. By Earl w. Kintner 
and Mark R. Joelson. New York: Macmillan. 1974. Pp. xiv, 391. 
$12.95. 
FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS. Revised Ed. 
By Wilbur L. Fugate. Boston: Little, Brown. 1973. Pp. xxv, 602. 
$35. 
Some seventeen years ago, Kingman Brewster and Wilbur Fu-
gate published their respective treatises on the application of United 
States antitrust legislation to foreign commerce.1 Since that time, 
important, relevant legal developments have occurred, 2 as well as 
events such as the debate over the wisdom and feasibility of antitrust 
litigation against the OPEC cartel, 3 the congressional investigation 
of the antitrust implications of corporate bribery of foreign govern-
ment officials, 4 and the formal initiation of proceedings against 
prominent foreign concerns.5 Yet, until the publication of An Inter-
1. K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AME.RICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1958); W. FU-
GATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND nm ANTITRUST LAws (1958). 
2. One of the more significant developments is the application of the Celler-
Kefauver Anti-Merger Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1970), to foreign commerce. See, 
e.g., United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966). 
In addition, important jurisdictional developments have occurred within domestic law, 
see, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 
(1962), and antitrust legislation has been enacted by other governments and inte-
grated economic communities. See, e.g., Treaty of Rome of the European Economic 
Community, March 25, 1957, arts. 85, 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-49; Treaty Instituting 
the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, arts. 65, 66, 261 U.N.T.S. 
140, 194-205. 
3. See Adams, Bringing OPEC to the Bar, Wall St. J., May 20, 1975, at 22, col. 4; 
BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 717, at A-21 (June 10, 1975); id., No. 725, 
at A-24 (Aug. 5, 1975); id., No. 729, at A-24 (Sept. 9, 1975). 
4. See 5 TRADE REG. REP. ,r 50,238 (testimony of D. Baker, Deputy Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Antitrust Division, before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of 
the House Comm. on International Relations, July 24, 1975). 
5. The FTC has initiated litigation against Nestle Alimontana, S.A. of Switzer-
land because of its acquisition of Stouffer Corporation, see Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1975, 
at 19, col. 1, and the Brunswick Corporation because of its acquisition of 38 per cent 
of the Japanese company Sanshin Kogyo, see, id., May 8, 1975, at 5, col. 1. 
The Antitrust Division has indicated a serious interest in attacking price-fixing 
agreements that affect domestic markets, see BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 
725, at A-12 (Aug. 5, 1975), in challenging an alleged international uranium cartel, 
see id., No. 724, at A-12 (July 29, 1975), and in taking action against the German 
firm CHH-AV in relation to its recent domestic acquisitions, see CCH Trade Reg. 
Rep. No. 179, at 5 (June 2, 1975). An Antitrust Division spokesman recently stated 
that a government suit to enjoin the merger of two foreign firms "could be brought 
where a substantial percentage of their foreign production was exported to U.S. mar-
kets . . .• " Address by Assistant Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section, D.E. 
Rosenthal, Business International Roundtable on Antitrust Policy, Washington, D.C., 
Oct. 15, 1975, BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 735, at A-17 (Oct. 21, 1971 ). 
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national Antitrust Primer (Primer) by Earl Kintner and Mark Joel-
son6 and the second edition of Fugate's Foreign Commerce and the 
Antitrust Laws, 7 there had been virtually no comprehensive treat-
ment of international antitrust law. 8 
An author's success must be assessed in part with reference to 
his objective. The first edition of the Fugate book stated that it was 
designed "as a guide for the general practitioner who has little ex-
6. Both Kintner and Joelson practice law in Washington, D.C. Kintner has 
served the FTC as member, general counsel, and chairman, and is the author of sev-
eral other books in the antitrust-trade regulation area: AN A.NrrrausT PRIMER (2d 
ed. 1973); PRIMER ON TIIE LA.w OF MERGERS (1973); and A ROBINSON-PATMAN 
PRIMER (1970). 
Several of the chapters in this book have appeared elsewhere. Chapter 12, Grop-
ing for a Truly International Antitrust Law, is essentially Kintner, Joelson & Vaghi, 
Groping for a Truly International Antitrust Law, 14 VA. J. INTL. L. 75 (1973 ), and 
the section of chapter 11, Some Important Antitrust Laws, devoted to the United 
Kingdom is essentially Kintner, Joelson & Griffin, Recent Developments in United 
Kingdom Antitrust Law, 19 ANJ:ITRUST BULL. 217 (1974). 
7. Mr. Fugate was Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust Divi-
sion from 1962-1973 and now practices law in Washington, D.C. The first edition 
of the book was based upon an S.J.D. thesis written at George Washington University 
Law School. For a discussion of the differences between the editions, see note 10 
infra and accompanying text. 
8. There have been numerous discussions of antitrust and foreign commerce, 
many of excellent quality, in the legal and economic periodical literature. As would 
be expected, most of these articles have focused on rather narrow topics. See, e.g., 
Adelman & Brooks, Territorial Restraints in International Technology Agreements 
After Topco, 17 ANTIIRUST BULL. 763 (1972); Allison, Antitrust and Foreign Trade: 
Exemption for Export Associations, 11 HOUSTON L. REv. 1124 (1974); Bloch, Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Sherman Act Cases, 54 AB.A.I. 781 (1968); 
Cooper, Tax and Antitrust Aspects of Foreign Licensing Transactions, 13 UCLAL. 
REv. 25 (1965); Donovan, The Legality of Acquisitions and Mergers Involving 
American and Foreign Corporations Under the United States Antitrust Laws, 39 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 526 (1966) (pt. I), 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 38 (1967) (pt. II); Fugate, 
Antitrust Aspects of Transatlantic Investment, 34 LA.w & CONTEMP. PROB. 135 
(1969); Fugate, Application of Antitrust Laws of the United States to International 
Trade: A Government Lawyer's View, 13 PRAc. LAW., Feb. 1967, at 25. Graham, 
Hermann & Marcus, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Mergers Involving Foreign 
Interests, 23 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1971); Graziano, Foreign Government Compulsion 
as a Defense in United States Antitrust Law, 1 VA. J. INTL. LAw 100 (1967); Haight, 
The Restrictive Business Practices Clause in United States Treaties: An Antitrust 
Tranquilizer for International Trade, 10 YALE L.J. 240 (1960); Heil & Vorbrugg, 
Antitrust Law in West Germany: Recent Developments in German and Common 
Market Regulation, 8 INTL. LAw. 349 (1974); Hildebrand & Matsushita, Antimonop-
oly Law of Japan-Potential Consequences of International Contract Violation, 6 
N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. & POL. 215 (1973); Joelson, International Technology Transfers 
and the United States Antitrust Laws, 8 J. INTL. L. & EcoN. 85 (1973); Jones, Amer-
ican Antitrust and EEC Competition Law in Comparative Perspective, 90 L.Q. REV. 
191 (1974); McFetridge, The Emergence of a Canadian Merger Policy: the ERCO 
Case, 19 ANJ:ITRUST BULL. 1 (1974); Scott & Yablonski, Transnational Mergers and 
Joint Ventures Affecting American Exports, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1969); Timberg, 
Impact of Antitrust Laws on Multinational Licensing and Franchising Agreements, 
13 .ANTIIRuST BULL. 39 (1968); Victor, Multinational Corporations: Antitrust Ex-
traterritoriality and the Prospect of Immunity, 8 J. INTL. LAw & EcoN. 11 (1973); 
Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent 
Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-Produc-
tion, 14 VA. J. INTL. L. 747 (1974). 
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perience in this field, for the economist or business executive who 
wants to be quickly oriented in one of the areas covered and for the 
specialist who desires a ready reference tool."0 This "deskbook" 
orientation is also characteristic of the second edition. While the 
organization of the second edition is quite like that of the first, the 
author has enlarged most chapters to encompass recent develop-
ments and added entirely new sections to the book.10 
In the Primer, Kintner and Joelson have similarly sought to "pro-
vide a readily usable [ work] to help and alert the business executive 
to shape his activities . . . and . . . to provide an up to date refer-
ence for the general practitioner'' (dustjacket). Thus, the stated 
objectives of the respective authors are very much the same. 
Unlike Professor Brewster's Antitrust and American Business 
Abroad, both the Fugate and the Kintner-Joelson books are primar-
ily descriptive and place little emphasis on policy analysis. For exam-
ple, despite the controversy in recent years over whether the United 
States antitrust laws disadvantage American businesses in foreign 
trade, 11 neither book contains much discussion or analysis of the 
question.12 Neither book treats in a sophisticated way the public 
policies underlying our antitrust legislation or its effects on our rela-
tions with other governments. Neither attempts to apply economic 
analysis to the law.13 
The organization of -the two works is quite similar. Both begin 
with a summary of federal antitrust legislation, its background and 
philosophy, and its application by the courts.14 Both books next ex-
9. Oppenheim, Editors Foreword to w. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND nm 
ANTITRUST LAWS at viii (1958). It is interesting that the second edition contains 
no such representation. 
10. For example, the author has expanded his discussion (see pp. 243-45) of the 
Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970), to include specific treatment of 
government-financed export sales in response to United States v. Concentrated Phos-
phate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199 (1968). Chapters 15 and 16 (pp. 433-91), dis-
cussing antitrust trends in foreign commerce and foreign antitrust laws, are new addi-
tions to the book. 
11. See, e.g., Hearings on International Aspects of Antitrust Before tlze Subcomm. 
on Antitrust and Monopoly of tlze Senate Comm. on tlze Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 3-36, 146-631 (1974). Fugate finds surprising the recent claims that Ameri-
can commerce is hindered and cites Senator Hart as authority for the contrary view 
(p. 2). 
12. For a recent and interestingly written analysis of antitrust and international 
buying cooperation, see Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy, and International Buying 
Cooperation, 84 YALE LJ. 268 (1974). 
13. Although all antitrust scholarship need not be economic in orientation, it nev-
ertheless is important that the antitrust bar consider the economic ramifications of 
antitrust developments. For a recent example of such treatment, see Posner, Exclu-
sionary Practices and tlze Antitrust lAws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506 (1974). 
14. Fugate begins with a brief discussion of the history of economic regulation 
of industrial organization, follows with a summary examination of each of the stat-
utes, and concludes with a discussion of public and private enforcement mechanisms 
(pp. 6-28). The Kintner-Joelson discussion, similarly organized except for the dis-
cussion of enforcement mechanisms, is less detailed and informative (pp. 1-20). 
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amine subject-matter jurisdiction, 15 jurisdiction over persons and cor-
porations, discovery, and venue.16 In discussing •the substantive law, 
both begin with the Sherman Act17 and then tum (in different or-
ders) to the "auxiliary" antitrust regulatory statutes;18 to the laws 
governing patents and trademarks,19 mergers, acquisitions and joint 
ventures;20 and to foreign antitrust legislation. 21 Each book does, 
15. Under the rubric of subject-matter jurisdiction, Fugate considers the erosion 
of the "limited territorial" principle and the evolution of the "objective territorial" 
principle of jurisdiction that culminated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Amer-
ica, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.). The author also considers questions 
of comity, the act of state doctrine, see notes 33-39 infra and accompanying text, 
and the extraterritorial application of the Noerr doctrine, see notes 65-66 infra and 
accompanying text, within this context (pp. 29-86). Again, the organization of the 
Primer is identical though much less detailed (pp. 21-32). 
16. The Fugate book's discussion of these topics is good, including a detailed 
treatment of the rights and obligations of subsidiaries, the seizure of property, and 
sovereign immunity, and an excellent treatment of forced production of documents 
by foreign corporations where such production raises the possibility of criminal or 
civil liability under foreign law (pp. 87-143). The Kintner-Joelson endeavor is simi-
lar, but again less detailed (pp. 33-68). 
17. Fugate devotes three chapters to the proscriptions of the Sherman Act. In 
chapter 4, Fugate treats in some detail pricing arrangements, market-sharing, foreign 
distributorships, and refusals to deal (pp. 144-72), while in chapter 5, the rule of 
reason, ancillary restraints, and antitrust defenses are examined (pp. 173-200). 
Chapter 6 contains the author's treatment of monopolization (pp. 201-22). Kintner 
and Joelson divide their consideration of the Sherman Act into discussions of the na-
ture of contracts, combinations and conspiracies, the rule of reason vis-a-vis per se 
offenses, price fixing, boycotts, refusals to deal, and monopolization (pp. 69-90). 
Separate discussions of vertical restraints on price, territorial allocation and other cus-
tomer restraints on resale, and exclusive dealing then follow (pp. 90-104). 
18. Fugate discusses the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970), in one 
chapter (pp. 223-54) and the other "auxiliary" statutes in another. The antitrust 
provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1970), the Robinson-Patman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c (1970), and section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 14 (1970), are discussed in some detail. A brief examination is included of the 
Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1970), the Federal Aviation Act of 
1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-542 (1970), the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 
U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970), the Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71 
(1970), and section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) (pp. 
393-414). Kintner and Joelson treat only the Federal Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 41-58 (1970), and Robinson-Patman Acts in any detail (pp. 105-17), reserving 
the other statutes for brief consideration in their chapter on exemptions (pp. 167-
"89). 
19. Fugate has a chapter on patents (pp. 255-302) and one on trademarks (pp. 
303-18). Of particular interest is his detailed discussion of cross licenses and patent 
interchanges (pp. 289-302). Kintner and Joelson devote one chapter to both trade-
marks and patents (pp. 139-66). 
20. Foreign subsidiaries and foreign acquisitions and mergers are the subject of 
Fugate's chapter 10 (pp. 319-53 ), while foreign and foreign-related joint ventures 
form his chapter 11 (pp. 354-71). Kintner and Joelson deal with mergers, acquisi-
tions, and joint ventures in one chapter (pp. 118-38). 
21. Chapter 16 contains Fugate's discussion (pp. 469-91); chapter 11 contains 
that of Kintner and Joelson (pp. 190-259). 
Both books also contain similar appendices. The Fugate book contains the text 
of the relevant domestic statutes and the rules of the Common Market (pp. 492-97, 
552-53'), the recommendations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (pp. 554-55), and a table of cases and secondary authorities (pp. 559-
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however, contain some collateral material not found in the other. 22 
While the books are similarly organized, the Fugate book is far 
more comprehensive in its treatment of •the relevant law. For ex-
ample, in his discussion of jurisdictional problems, Fugate devotes 
attention to the sensitive question of sovereign immunity and to the 
distinctions between the public and the proprietary functions of gov-
ernments (pp. 111-14). In so doing, he analyzes the significant 
antitrust cases23 and considers the applicable provisions of the Re-
statement of Foreign Relations Law, the policies of the Department 
of State, various treaty provisions, and the literature on the topics. 
In contrast, Kintner and Joelson do not discuss these issues. Unfor-
tunately, neither book considers the converse and very timely ques-
tion whether a foreign sovereign has standing to sue under the anti-
trust laws. 2 4: 
Another important distinction between the books is the respective 
authors' use of citations. While the Fugate book is well-docu-
mented with citations to statutes, decisions, regulations, and second-
ary materials, Kintner and Joelson generally eschew the use of ci-
71). It also includes a table of all of the foreign commerce cases that have been 
instituted by the Antitrust Division, including those settled by consent decree, indicat-
ing the nature of the action and its disposition (pp. 498-543). The appendix to the 
Primer contains the text of the relevant domestic statutes and Common Market trea-
ties (pp. 310-50, 363-76), a selected bibliography (pp. 273-309), and the Merger 
Guidelines of the Department of Justice (pp. 351-62). 
22. For instance, Fugate devotes a chapter to a general discussion of the antitrust 
ramifications of investment abroad by United States companies and foreign invest• 
ment in this country and concludes with a short examination of problems faced by 
the multinational enterprise (pp. 372-92). Fugate also examines antitrust relief (in-
cluding the consent decree) in foreign commerce cases and the particularly difficult 
problems of obtaining and enforcing such equitable relief as a royalty-free license or 
a dedication in an international context (pp. 416-42). He also briefly evaluates the 
impact of United States antitrust enforcement on foreign commerce and foreign pol-
icy (pp. 443-66). 
Kintner and Joelson separately explore antitrust exemptions (pp. 167-89) and ex-
amine the possibility of an "international antitrust law" (pp. 260-72). 
23. Compare United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 
(S.D.N.Y. 1929), in which the French Government unsuccessfully contended that the 
defendant Societe Commerciale des Potasses d'Alsace was a government entity, with 
In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952), in which 
it was successfully contended that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was an instrumen-
tality of Her Majesty's Government. See also Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of 
Greece, 326 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1964); In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping 
Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Cal. 1960). 
24. After United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 600 (1941), which held that the 
United States government did not have standing to invoke the federal antitrust law, 
it appeared that no sovereign had the requisite standing to sue. Nevertheless, in re-
cent years the governments of Iran, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Kuwait have 
filed actions as plaintiffs. See State of Kuwait v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 333 F. Supp. 
315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). They have not, however, been allowed to sue as parens pa-
triae on behalf of their citizens. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 1975-2 Trade Cas. 67,045 (8th 
Cir. Aug. 27, 1975). A similar interesting, but only briefly discussed, question is 
whether the Sherman Act prohibits conspiracies that injure only foreigners. Cf. K. 
BREWSTER, supra note 1, at 82; Davidow, supra note 12, at 275. 
November 1975] Recent Books 169 
tations. In their discussion of jurisdiction, for example, they state 
the facts and holdings of a number of cases but frequently fail to 
provide the reader with either the case names or citations. 25 Simi-
larly, when quoting from secondary source material, they properly 
give credit to the source but give no page citation. 26 These omis-
sions seriously compromise the book's value to lawyers. 
The books are also distinguishable in their treatment of back-
ground material. Reflecting their intent to write a primer that 
would in part serve business people, 27 Kintner and Joelson rather 
painstakingly explore the general antitrust doctrine before discussing 
its application to foreign commerce. For example, in the Primer's 
discussion of territorial and customer restraints on resale, the basic 
principles of White Motor Company28 and Schwinn29 are first dis-
cussed before the problem is addressed in its international setting 
(pp. 94-97). Fugate presumes a greater prior acquaintance with 
the subject matter, but nevertheless frequently provides much back-
ground discussion.30 
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the Fugate book is the 
author's failure to draw more fully from his experiences as Chief 
of the Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust Division. For ex-
ample, he appropriately discusses the "Fulton-Rogers Agreement,"31 
but deals with its actual impact in only a very superficial manner (p. 
51). Most antitrust practitioners are familiar with the agreement's 
existence and provisions but would like to learn whether it has 
been implemented in any meaningful manner and, if so, the details 
of that implementation. 32 
Both books also suffer from sins of commission. An example 
is the authors' examination of the act of state doctrine. Fugate de-
votes considerable discussion to American Banana33 (in which the 
25. See, e.g., pp. 39-40. 
26. See, e.g., p. 35. 
27. Indeed, the book is subtitled A Businessman's Guide to the International As-
pects of United States Antitrust Law and to Key Foreign Antitrust Laws. 
28. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
29. United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
30. For example, prior to discussing monopolization in international trade, the 
author sets out the elements of monopolization and examines the criteria utilized in 
defining the relevant product and geographic markets (pp. 201-06). 
31. ,[1970] Can. Y.B. Intl L 267-72. This informal agreement between the 
governments of the United States and Canada (named for then Attorney General 
Rogers and former Minister of Justice Fulton, and updated in 1969 by former Attor-
ney General Mitchell and former Minister of Corporate and Consumer Affairs Bash-
ford) provides for notification and consultation between the two governments when 
the interests of either will be affected by their respective antitrust enforcement. 
32. Similarly, some amplification of the author's discussion of the Antitrust Divi-
sion's business-review procedures would have been useful (seep. 23). 
33. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). In that 
case a domestic corporation organized to import bananas to the United States brought 
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doctrine was formulated) and its progeny (pp. 75-82). He argues 
that the teaching of the case law is that, while liability under the Sher-
man Act cannot be founded "solely on the influencing of officials 
or legislation in another country" (p. 76, emphasis original), the act 
of state doctrine will not insulate allegedly anticompetitive acts if 
anything more is involved (p. 76). He concludes that the subse-
quent cases have distinguished American Banana except where for-
eign law or executive authority requires or commands the allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct; where there is no compulsion, the offense 
is cognizable in United States courts.34 Kintner and Joelson, while 
devoting significantly less attention to the topic, reach a similar con-
clusion (p. 29). 35 While there is some authority for this proposi-
tion, 36 to proffer it as the state of the law is misleading. 87 Indeed, 
the Antitrust Division has recently recognized that present case law 
in the area is relatively uncertain. 38 
It might be argued that the authors of both books have confused 
the act of state doctrine with its corollary, the doctrine of foreign 
suit under the Clayton Act. The plaintiff corporation alleged that in 1903 its prede-
cessor (McConnell) had started a banana plantation in the Department of Panama, 
United States of Colombia, and had begun to build a railway to transport his crop. 
McConnell was allegedly threatened by the defendant and told to combine with its 
interests or stop his operations. In November 1903, Panama revolted and established 
a government independent of Colombia. The following June, the plaintiff bought out 
McConnell and continued his operations. But the next month Costa Rican troops 
occupied the plantation, ejected the plaintiff, and halted railroad construction and 
plantation operations. Although an earlier arbitration agreement settling a boundary 
dispute between Colombia and Costa Rica over the Panamanian border had provided 
that the plaintif rs holdings were within the Department of Panama, that August, one 
Astua obtained an ex parte judgment from a Costa Rican court that declared the 
plantation to be his. Defendant's agents then purchased the lands from Astua. 
Costa Rica continued to assert jurisdiction over the area, and Panama subsequently 
consented to the acquisition. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit for failure 
to state a cause of action and was affirmed on appeal. 
34. Fugate asserts that there are three possible situations in which this defense 
may be asserted: first, when foreign law or executive authority requires or directs the 
act or contracts in question; second, when foreign law or executive authority ac-
quiesces in such acts or contracts; and third, when foreign law does not prohibit such 
acts or contracts. Fugate asserts that only in the first situation should the defense 
apply (p. 76). 
35. Kintner has also discussed the topic elsewhere and in somewhat greater detail. 
See Kintner & Hallgarten, Application of United States Antitrust Laws to Foreign 
Trade and Commerce-Variations 011 American Banana Since 1909, 15 B.C. IND. & 
CoM. L. REV. 343 (1973 ). 
36. See, e.g., Graziano, supra note 8, at 116. See also ABA, ANTI-TRUST LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS 367 (1975). Continental Ore Corp. v. Union Carbide & Carbon 
Co., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), and United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 
(1927), are among the most frequently cited cases as authority for this position. 
However, these cases can be read otherwise. 
37. See notes 39-55 infra and accompanying text. 
38. See 5 TRADE REG. REP. ,r 50,238 (testimony of D. Baker, Deputy Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Antitrust Div., before Subcomm. on Intl. Econ. Policy of the House Comm. 
on Intl. Relations, July 24, 1975). 
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government compulsion. 39 Recent case law well illustrates the en-
tanglement. For example, in Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes 
Gas & Oil Co.,40 the plaintiff had been granted an exclusive conces-
sion by the Sheik of Umm al Qaywayn to explore for, extract, and 
sell oil. Defendants negotiated a similar arrangement with the Sheik 
of Sharjah.41 After learning of rich oil deposits within the plaintiff's 
concession, the defendants allegedly induced the Shiek of Sharjah 
to assert sovereignty over the oil-rich segment.42 The Sheik of 
Umm al Qaywayn was forced to relinquish his claim over the dis-
puted territory,43 and the land with its oil then fell within the defend-
ants' concession. The defendants successfully argued that the act 
of state doctrine precluded consideration of the Sherman Act claims. 
There was no evidence, nor was an allegation required, that the for-
eign sovereign compelled or directed the defendants' participation in 
the allegedly anticompetitive conduct. Rather, the court assumed it 
was the defendants who induced the conduct of the Sheik of Sharjah. 
The court determined that an adjudication on the merits would nev-
ertheless require it to sit in judgment on the acts of another sover-
eign done within the sovereign's territory.44 And the court ex-
pressly stated that the act of state doctrine as articulated in American 
Banana barred its exercise of jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact 
that the allegedly anticompetitive conduct was induced or otherwise 
procured by the defendant. 45 This holding is in accord with Ameri-
39. The distinction between these doctrines has been recently recognized by the 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in testimony before Subcomm. on International 
Economic Policy of the House Comm. on International Relations. 5 TRADE REG. 
REP. ,r 50,238, at 55,445. Fugate's mixup is bizarre since he notes the distinct nature 
of the doctrine in a closing paragraph of his discussion of the topic (seep. 82). 
40. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affd., 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972). 
41. Both Shatjah and Umm al Qaywayn are sheikdoms in what is commonly re-
ferred to as the Trucial States, now the United Arab Emirates, located at the south-
eastern tip of the Persian Gulf. 
42. Prior to the discovery, the plaintiff and the defendants had amicably agreed 
to share seismic and subsoil test information. Presumably, the defendants learned 
of the plaintiffs good fortune in this manner. 
43. The facts as alleged are colorful. The plaintiffs argued that the Sheik of 
Sharjah,. in making his claim, had used fraudulently back-dated letters and decrees. 
The Sheik's representations had failed to convince the British Foreign Office, which, 
according to treaty, managed the foreign relations of the Trucial States. Undaunted, 
the defendants had allegedly enlisted the aid of the Iranian government. Ultimately, 
the British requested the plaintiff to refrain from its activities in the area until the 
dispute could be resolved. The British allegedly secured the consent of the Shei·k of 
Umm al Qaywayn by stationing troops around the palace, "buzzing" the palace with 
British aircraft, and threatening the Sheik with exile. 
44. 331 F. Supp. at 108. This is the classic formulation of the act of state doc-
trine expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 
U.S. 250, 252 (1897). 
45. 331 F. Supp. at 110. ("[f]he holding of American Banana that has endured 
is that the act of state doctrine bars a claim for antitrust injuzy flowing from foreign 
sovereign acts allegedly induced and procured by the defendant"). 
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can Banana, yet it does not fit within Fugate's act of state rubric.46 
Nor does it stand alone among recent decisions.47 American Ba-
nana therefore cannot readily be dismissed as no longer viable on 
this point. 
A better distillation of the case law is that the act of state doc-
trine may appropriately be invoked whenever a court would be 
called upon to sit in judgment on the internal acts of another sover-
eign, notwithstanding that the defendant's conduct was uncom-
pelled. 48 However, if a foreign state has required or directed the 
allegedly anticompetitive conduct, then a distinct but related doc-
trine, that of foreign government compulsion, applies.40 A court 
determining whether these doctrines apply might properly look first 
at the most restrictive: If the alleged anticompetitive conduct is man-
dated by a foreign sovereign, the doctrine of foreign government 
compulsion should control. 50 If not, although Fugate and Kintner 
and Joelson seem to suggest the opposite, •the inquiry is not termi-
nated. Rather, the court should consider whether it would never-
theless be required to judge the propriety of the activities of a for-
eign sovereign. 51 
46. See note 34 supra. 
I am not sure that I understand Fugate's treatment of American Banana. He sug-
gests that that case is no longer good law to the extent it does not require the com-
pulsion of a foreign sovereign as a requisite to the successful invocation of the act 
of state doctrine (p. 76). But Occidental Petroleum and other cases seem to under-
mine Fugate's thesis. I do agree that American Banana has been seriously eroded, 
but in a different way. A better reading of that decision would reveal its dual hold-
ing. First, dismissal was granted because the court held that the antitrust laws had 
no extraterritorial effect. I would agree that this segment of the Court's opinion has 
long since been abandoned. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co,, 221 
U.S. 106, 184 (1911); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 
444 (2d Cir. 1945). Second, dismissal was granted under the act of state doctrine. 
This aspect of the opinion continues to be viable in cases like Occidental Petroleum. 
41. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Natl. Trust & Sav. Assn., 
No. C-73-0792 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1974) (unreported). 
48. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); 
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Calif, 
1971); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Natl. Trust & Sav. Assn., No. 
C-73-0792 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 1974) (unreported). 
49. An excellent example of this type of case is Interamerican Refining Corp. 
v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970) (discussed at pp. 80-
81 in Fugate's book). In an action under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the plain-
tiff refining corporations alleged, and the defendant oil producers did not deny, re-
peated refusals to sell Venezuelan crude oil. The defendants pleaded the defense of 
foreign compulsion, alleging that the Venezuelan government, under whose license 
they operated, had forbidden them from selling oil to the plaintiffs and that they had 
only refused to deal with the plaintiffs in order to comply with that order. (Many 
of the plaintiffs' principal stockholders were, or had been, Venezuelan citizens hostile 
to the government then in power.) The court held that compulsion constituted a 
complete defense and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
50. See Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 
1291 (D. Del. 1970), discussed in note 49 supra. 
51. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Oil & Gas Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Cal. 1971), 
November 1975] Recent Books 173 
This formulation is preferable in light of the underlying policies 
of the act of state doctrine. The most important of these are inter-
national comity and the principle that governmental interaction with 
foreign states is exclusively an executive function. 52 It is generally 
accepted that an investigation into whether a foreign sovereign com-
pelled anticompetitive conduct violates notions of comity and may 
impede the implementation of foreign policy by the executive. 53 
Regardless of whether a Trucial shiek sua sponte decides that it is 
in his country's best interest to eliminate a competitor from the 
marketplace or is "only" a willing participant in a scheme devised 
by others, a court is presented with the very same problem. Had 
Occidental been decided otherwise, an American court would have 
been forced to determine whether the claims of the Shiekdom of 
Sharjah to the disputed territory were bona fide or induced by the 
defendants. As the Occidental court perceptively noted, "[S]uch in-
quiries by this court into the . . . motivation of the acts of foreign 
sovereigns would be the very sources of diplomatic friction and com-
plication that the act of state doctrine aims to avert."54 For this rea-
son participation, not coercion, should be the requisite test. 55 
This is not to say that the respective authors' characterization of 
the law is necessarily incorrect. One might plausibly argue that nei-
ther tenet of American Banana is presently viable and that there 
has recently been a failure by some courts to adhere to the appro-
priate rule. 56 But neither book notes that several courts have re-
aff d:, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Natl. Trust & Sav. Assn., No. C-73-
0792 {N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1974) (unreported). 
52. Cf. Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
53. But cf. 69 MICH. L. REv. 888 (1971). 
54. 331 F. Supp. at 110. The plaintiff had also alleged that several of the sheik's 
acts were in violation of international law, but the court found that the act of state 
doctrine was again applicable and barred consideration of that allegation. Moreover, 
the court ruled that "because a private antitrust claim requires proof of damage result-
ing from forbidden conduct, plaintiffs necessarily ask this court to 'sit in judgment' 
upon the sovereign acts pleaded, whether or not the countries involved are considered 
co-conspirators." 331 F. Supp. at 110. 
55. As Professor Brewster has written: "While it is theoretically possible that a 
government might be able to assert the fact of instigation of the alleged foreign legal 
compulsion on American firms, it still holds true that United States courts will be 
loathe to inquire into the motives underlying foreign statutes." K. BREWSTER, supra 
note 1, at 96. Continental Ore Corp. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 
690 (1962); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), United States v. Sisal 
Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927), and United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland 
Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), should be 
viewed as cases in which the court would not be called upon to pass on the validity 
of the acts of foreign governments. These cases appropriately fall within Fugate's 
second category. See note 46 supra. Cf. K. BREWSTER, supra, at 95. 
56. See 12 VA. J. INTL. L. 413 (1972). Cf. 21 J. PUB. L. 151 (1972). But 
see 5 VAND. J. TRANs. L. 251 (1972). Indeed, Fugate does an admirable job of 
making this argument (pp. 76-78). His reliance on Continental Ore Co. v. Union 
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cently adopted a different approach. The authors may have stated 
the position they personally find most agreeable; if so, they should 
have informed their readers of this, particularly in volumes designed 
to acquaint nonspecialized practitioners and business people with 
new terrain. 57 
Also perplexing is the respective authors' treatment of the ques-
·tion of the amount of foreign trade that must be affected to establish 
subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. Kintner and 
Joelson virtually ignore this important issue except to state that "it 
is now well established that the Sherman Act is applicable to acts 
... if they have an intended substantial effect on U.S. commerce" 
(p. 23). Fugate treats the issue in more detail (pp. 196-98), but 
his analysis is somewhat incomplete. He concludes that while it is 
clear that the amount of commerce affected is not important as to 
unreasonable per se offenses, as to other types of offenses "the for-
eign trade cases furnish no real guide as to the amount of commerce 
which is necessary"58 (p. 198). Neither book discusses the authori-
ties indicating that the substantiality of the actual effect on com-
merce is important. For example, in the Japanese Wire Nails 
Case, 59 the court intimated that the restraint on United States foreign 
commerce must be both direct and substantial. And the Attorney 
General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws con-
cluded that, even if the defendant firm is engaged in foreign com-
merce, the Sherman Act applies only where "substantial anticom-
petitive effects" upon American foreign trade are demonstrated. 00 
Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 690 (1972), and United States v. Sisal Sales Corp,, 
274 U.S. 268 (1962), is well taken. That argument need not be repeated here. 
57. Perhaps Fugate has raised the red flag in telling his readers that the "book 
is intended to indicate such a safe path in the foreign commerce field • . . ." {p. 
4; emphasis added). 
58. Fugate cites United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); 
United· States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), and United States v. 
General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), as authority for this con-
clusion. Fuguate may well be correct; nevertheless, it must be noted that the cited 
cases are not direct authority for the principle. Neither Trenton Potteries nor 
Socony-Vacuum Oil were cases involving foreign commerce and thus the question of 
the requisite quantum of commerce necessary to sustain federal jurisdiction in that 
context was not before either court. While General Dyestuff was a foreign com-
merce case, that court merely held that federal antitrust law does not distinguish be-
tween the "strangling" of existing commerce and preventing the initiation of nonex-
isting commerce; both are actionable. Undoubtedly these cases lend support to Fu-
gate's argument; that is not to say-as he seems to--that they establish it. 
59. United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957), 
See also United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 
Trade Cas. 77,414, at 77,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
60. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMITIEE To STUDY THE ANTI-TRUST 
LAWS, REPORT 70 (1955). The Committee concludes: "We feel that the Sherman 
Act applies only to those arrangements between Americans alone, or in concert with 
foreign firms, which have such substantial anticompetitive effects on this country's 
'trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations' as to constitute unreasonable re-
straints." Id. at 76. It is noteworthy that Fugate served as the Antitrust Division's 
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Other authorities would require a substantial effect only in limited 
circumstances. At least one court has recently stated in dicta that 
only some effect on foreign commerce need be alleged to secure fed-
eral jurisdiction, but that a substantial effect must be demonstrated 
to support a finding of liability.61 One commentator has suggested 
that the substantiality of the effect is relevant only when the effect 
is indirect. 62 The split in authority calls for treatment of this issue 
in greater detail. 
Even though the topics are pregnant with significant policy is-
sues, discussion of public policy is conspicuously absent from the ex-
aminations in both books of the act of state doctrine and the require-
ment of substantiality of anticompetitive effect. The authors' reluc-
tance to discuss policy considerations is a consistent characteristic of 
both works. For example, while both books seem to conclude that 
the Incandescent Lamp Case63 is an extremely narrow construction 
of the Wilson Tariff Act, 64 neither pursues the policy implications. 
Fugate postulates that the court's construction "is not in accord with 
the purpose of the act," (p.397) but goes no further. Kintner and 
Joelson also conclude that the case "illustrates the problems that lurk 
in a statute with relatively limited objectives in mind" (p. 16), but 
again do not further analyze the act. Similarly, in his discussion of 
the Noerr doctrine, 65 Fugate outlines the state of the law and con-
cludes that the doctrine has no extraterritorial application (pp. 84-
86). 66 However, he never considers whether the result is a sound 
liaison to the Attorney General's National Committee. Presumably, he is well ac-
quainted with the Committee's Report. 
61. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 
102-03 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affd., 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 950 (1972). It is very important to note that the court of appeals expressly 
limited its affirmance to the trial court's holding with reference to the act of state 
doctrine and therefore did not reach this question. 
62. J. VON KALIMOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND ORGANIZATION§ 5.02[2] (1974). 
63. United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.NJ. 1949). 
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1970). The court held that a participant in an otherwise 
illegal conspiracy must be actually engaged in importing before there is an offense 
under the act. 
' 65. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 
(1961). In Noerr, the plaintiff trucking companies alleged that the defendant rail-
roads had conspired to oppose legislation favorable to truckers and unfavorable to 
railroads. The Court held that such conduct was not actionable because of first 
amendment barriers. But cf. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking, Unltd., 
404 U.S. 508 (1972); United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 360 F. Supp. 451 (D. 
Minn.), atfd., 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
66. This is the position recently taken by the court in Occidental Petroleum Corp. 
v. Buttes Oil & Gas Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107-08 (C.D. Cal. 1971), atfd., 461 F.2d 
1261, (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 ( 1972). While the court 
of appeals affirmed the decision, it expressed no opinion as to this segment of the 
lower court's decision. As Fugate notes, albeit somewhat ambiguously, it has been 
argued that Noerr has extraterritorial application. See, e.g., Graziano, supra note 8, 
at 132. Moreover, Professor Areeda has suggested that Noerr might have application 
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one. Kintner and Joelson discuss neither the Noerr doctrine nor its 
relation to public policy.67 
As deskbooks, the works should be effectively cross-indexed. 
While the Fugaite book generally wins high marks in this regard, in 
many places it could be improved. For example; the author includes 
a subsection entitled "Antitrust Provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act" 
(pp. 393-98). Elsewhere in the book, Fugate discusses the Wilson 
Tariff Act as it relates to resale price maintenance (pp. 153-55)68 
and seizure-forfeiture means of securing jurisdiction (pp. 108-09). 
Regrettably, there is no cross-reference to these discussions within 
the primary treatment of the act.69 Just as they omitted citations, 
Kintner and Joelson included no cross-references. 
The Fugate book avowedly attempts to delineate the "safe 
path"70-probably reflecting the author's lengthy association with 
the Antitrust Division. Kintner and Joelson do not expressly make 
such a representation, but theirs is also an exposition of the safe 
path-perhaps a result of Kintner's tenure with the FTC. Given this 
intent, the respective authors' presentations are generally fair. But 
on occasion both books, and particularly the Fugate work, overstate 
the plaintiff-government position to the point of misleading the 
reader. The treatment of the act of state doctrine is again an ex-
ample.71 A more pointed example is Fugate's statement in his dis-
cussion of the Robinson-Patman Act72 that "one case [Nashville 
Milk Co. v. Carnation Co.73] has held that § 3, the Borah-Van Nuys 
Amendment, is not one of the 'antitrust laws' for the purpose of 
treble damage actions." He thus implies that only one case has so 
to the petitioning of democratic governments. See P . .AREEDA, ANnmusr ANALYSIS, 
,r 187, at 68 n.206 (1967). Interestingly, Professor Areeda has made no similar 
suggestion in his second edition. 
67. For a discussion of this question, see Note, Corporate Lobbyists Abroad: 
The Extraterritorial Application of Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity, 61 CALIF. 
L. REv. 1254 (1973). 
68. Fugate notes the very interesting question, raised by Judge Frank's dissent in 
Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distrib. Co., 189 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1951), 
whether the insulation of retail price maintenance provided by the passage of the 
Miller-Tydings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), applies with the same vigor to foreign 
commerce as it does to domestic commerce. Although both the Sherman Act and 
the Wilson Tariff Act proscribe vertical price fixing, the exculpatory language within 
the Miller-Tydings Act mentions only the Sherman Act and makes no reference to 
the Wilson Tariff Act. Fugate does not consider whether the language of the 
McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), passed since Adams-Mitchell, renders the 
whole question moot-if the majority opinion in Adams-Mitchell did not already do 
so. 
69. This defect is remedied somewhat by the excellent index, which directs the 
reader to all places where the Act is mentioned. 
10. See note 39 supra. 
71. See notes 33-56 supra and accompanying text. 
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c (1970). 
73. 238 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1956). 
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held (p. 399) and neglects to state either that the Supreme Court 
affirmed that decision 74 or that a host of other courts have similarly 
held that no private, cause of action accrues for violation of the 
Borah-VanNuys amendment.75 
Both books are interestingly written, well organized, and au-
thored by knowledgeable and experienced scholar-practitioners. But 
despite their similarities, the two books attain different measures of 
success by whatever standard they are gauged. Fugate well achieved 
his goal of writing a handbook for the general practitioner. The 
book is also sufficiently detailed to provide a handy reference work 
for the antitrust specialist. On the other hand, despite representa-
tions by Kintner and Joelson that the Primer is meant "to provide 
an up-to-date reference for the general practitioner who counsels 
businessmen," its lack of detail, superficial discussion, and absence 
of documentation seriously compromise that end. The Primer is 
therefore a poor investment for lawyers, whether general practi-
tioners or specialists. 
The Kintner and Joelson book better achieves its principal goal 
of serving as a primer for business people. For nonlawyers desiring 
a cursory overview of the application of antitrust law to foreign com-
merce, the Primer may be the better book because it assumes 
less familiarity with the subject matter. Nevertheless, the more de-
tailed treatment of the subject in the Fugate book will be more use-
ful to many business people, and most with antitrust problems in a 
foreign context are not likely to have difficulty reading the more 
detailed and comprehensive Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust 
Laws. 
74. 355 U.S. 373 (1958). 
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